The Bush Administration's Second Worst Decision Ever

In one respect, the governments of the United States and Iran are similar. These two very different systems share a peculiar feature. When the government takes an outrageous position, or provokes international furor through some action, there is a good chance that the "official line" is far from the consensus opinion of a sovereign state's government. Take yesterday's news that the State department may place Iran's Revolutionary Guard on the list of terrorist organizations. An Iranian might conclude that America's government is irreconcilably hostile to his nation. In fact, he is just witnessesing a ploy for power by a single ideological stratum within the Bush administration. But how would he know? Americans are similarly unable to identify who is truly responsible for any number of international incedents provoked by Iran. Who ordered the capture of British troops in disputed waters several months ago? Ahmedinejad? Unlikely. The Supreme Leader? Who knows? Perhaps just a more radical sect of Iran's armed forces acting independently. But in this latest incident in the three decade long comedy of errors, we can squarely put the blame mainly on Secretary Rice and Vice President Cheney. The two are rightly frustrated with the lack of progress regarding Iran's nuclear program, but they don't seem to understand that they have just made the situation much, much, worse.
The Revolutionary Guard may not be equatable with, say, the Salvation Army, but classifying them as a terrorist organization belies our commitment to take organizations like Al-Qaeda seriously. There are serious complaints about the guards activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Iran is also playing a constructive role in these two nations. Remember, in both nations the US replaced Sunni regimes that were mostly hostile to Iran. The fundamental pillar on which the concept of terrorism rests is that a terrorist is a criminal, not a soldier. He can be arrested, put on trial, and convicted for his crimes in a a court of law. (Of course, the administration doesn't really seem to understand that either) But a soldier is not a criminal. In a just legal system, one that respects internaitonal law, he is not put on trial for the act of taking up arms for his nation. What signal is the administration trying to send by classifying Iran's armed forces as a criminal organization? How can Iranians of any political stripe, regardless of what they think of the Revolutionary Guards, see it as anything but an affront to their sovereignty? If President Bush is prudent, he will disbause anymore notions of this silliness before it gets out of hand, and we once more go to the brink with Iran.

Mayberry Machiavelli: On the Rise and Fall of Karl Rove

Karl Rove is no more. In fact, the idea of Karl Rove has been dead for some time now. There came a time when Rove's hubris and absolute confidence in his own strategies failed to match up with actual results. In 2006, Rove blithely predicted that the GOP would hold on to Congress. If Rove had been right again, his legend would have only grown. But as it was, Rove's confidence now just makes him look clueless. A worthwhile question is whether Rove was ever actually the wizard he has been made out to be. What exactly did Karl Rove accomplish? Looking at Bush's winning Presidential campaign, it seems clear that the answer can only be "not much." Rove delivered two of the narrowest election victories in the history of the United States. His strategy of "polarization" accomplished absolutely nothing for conservatism, and in the long run has only strengthened the hand of the Democratic party. A Bush victory in 2004 was probably better for the Democratic party (though not for the world) than a Bush defeat. After seven years of the "Boy Genius" at work, the Dems are in a much better position than they were when they held the White House. America's political discourse, on issues from health care to the environment to gay rights to defense, has moved substantially to the left in these past seven years. A March poll from the Pew Research Center showed that 50 per cent of Americans identify as Democrats while only 35 per cent say they are Republican. A June NBC-Wall Street Journal poll showed 52 per cent of Americans would prefer a Democratic president while only 31 per cent would support a Republican, the largest gap in the 20-year history of the survey. Of course, we shouldn't give Deputy Chief of Staff Rove more credit than he is due. Putting American Conservatism in disarray was a job that could have only been accomplished by a good team effort. So to all of you out there, from the neocons to the theocrats, who showed the USA the wonders of governance form the right, I would just like to send out a heartfelt thank you.

A Return of the Caliphs?

Guest Piece by The Resident Historian
It's been relatively quiet in the Middle East this summer (apart from Iraq, that is). However, the peace is very tenuous and indeed violence could re-erupt at the drop of a hat, just like last summer. I think it crucial, then, to offer this as an idea for the future of that troubled region.

Many academics and religious groups in the Muslim world have called for the restoration of the ancient caliphs (a word that literally means ‘successor’). The practice began with the election of Abu Bakr to succeed Mohammed after his death and continue to spread Islam.

A modern caliph, a supreme religious authority in Islamic society, holds several key solutions to what observers describe as the "pestilences of Islam". Of particular note, such an authority would be able to unify large portions of the Muslim populace. Not necessarily the whole religion, as that would be a far fetch. However, I don't think it impossible to have, say, a Caliph for the Sunnis, who could denounce, and thereby limit support for, Wahabbi extremists or other similar radical factions. A caliph would also create a single source of legitimate evaluation and representation of the religion. This would promote solidarity and prevent internal disputes from further fracturing Muslim society. And while the idea seems to effuse clerical conservatism, it is probably the best way to mollify the more archaic and inhumane practices of shariah law.

It is important to note that the original caliphs’ successions were either deathbed nominations or contentious confrontations (one resulting in the Sunni-Shiite rift), and the following caliphs ruled by appointment or hereditary succession. However, seeing as the modern world requires a more representative administration, it would probably be best if the caliphs were elected popularly, or at least by Majiles of assembled Imams. True, this process would be a bit contentious and undoubtedly spark protest groups to splinter from the mainstream, but that would be to their own disadvantage, and the process would still ensure legitimacy for the general, moderate, popular will of the greater Muslim community.

Another point is that the caliphs of old were political heads as well as religious. However, the modern revival must be clear that today’s caliphs are to have religious authority, but no power in any political form. From Othman to the fall of Baghdad to Mongols, caliphs found nothing but trouble in the political arena. The Umayyad dynasty, a group famed for bringing Byzantine administration to a cohesive Muslim community, saw their entire crumble to less than half of Spain because they dared to rule like “kings instead of caliphs”.
The idea is shaky, but doable if pursued correctly, and the yields could be tremendous along the line of Middle East Peace. Only with legitimate authority can the fringe groups of Muslim society be reigned in and can the open culture that once flourished under caliphate rule reemerge in modern times. A good man for this kind of duty might be King Abdullah II of Jordan – an enlightened, open-minded man who is beloved by Muslims and adored by Western leaders. But the time for this form of action is running out. Who knows how long this peace will last?